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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PRESENT STATE

OF

EAST-INDIA AFFAIRS,

AND EXAMINATION OF

Mr. FOX's BILL;

SUGGESTING

CERTAIN MATERIAL ALTERATIONS

FOR

AVERTING THE DANGERS

AND

PRESERVING THE BENEFITS OF THAT BILL.

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THE following ſheets were drawn up during the Chriſtmas receſs by a Member of Parliament, who, by arranging his thoughts on the ſubject of Eaſt-India affairs, wiſhed to aſſiſt himſelf in forming a proper eſtimate of what was valuable or faulty in Mr. Fox's India Bill, which had then been recently rejected in the Houſe of Lords.

Having in the courſe of that examination formed his own opinion decidedly on the ſubject, the manuſcript was communicated to ſome of his friends, who felt an anxiety ſimilar to his own, that the beſt poſſible plan for Indian Affairs ſhould be adopted.

Some of the perſons who had thus occaſion to peruſe the Author's reaſonings with himſelf, expreſſed their concurrence in the ſame ſentiments, and teſtified a ſtrong deſire that they ſhould be offered to the public, in the perſuaſion that the ſuggeſtions contained in the following ſheets, unbiaſſed by any party motives, might poſſibly be of ſome utility even at the preſent moment.

Deference to the opinions and to the wiſhes of thoſe friends, has given riſe to this publication.

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PRESENT STATE OF EAST-INDIA AFFAIRS,

AND

EXAMINATION OF MR. FOX's BILL.

WHATEVER benefits or privileges may be ſuppoſed to have been granted to the Eaſt India Company by charters and acts of parliament in their favour, that Company would ſoon ceaſe to be in a condition of availing themſelves of theſe advantages, if the government or legiſlature of this country did not ſpeedily afford them aid as to pecuniary matters, and aſſiſt them with new parliamentary regulations, for the management of their affairs.

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The cry therefore which has been raiſed, about the *invaſion of chartered rights*, ſeems to be miſplaced upon the preſent occaſion; for if government were diſpoſed to abſtain from doing any thing favourable or unfavourable to the Eaſt India Company, theſe chartered rights would be as effectually diſſolved and deſtroyed by this inaction, as they could be by any active operation of the legiſlature, ſince the embarraſſments and diſorders in the Company's affairs at home and abroad muſt ſoon lead to confuſion and ruin, if unaſſiſted by government.

That ſuch a criſis ſhould be averted, is, no doubt, highly expedient for the intereſts of the community at large, as well as thoſe of the Eaſt India Company; but when government does ſo, by uſing the meaſures of prevention, inſtead of waiting for that diſſolution of the Company which would be the conſequence of with-holding aid from them, it is fair in argument to ſay, that government, at the time of affording this aid, is entitled to make certain ſtipulations for the

the public benefit, and with that view to regulate and new model the Company's charters and privileges, in the ſame manner, if not to the ſame extent, as if the Company, upon the expiration of their original charters, were treating for a new bargain; it being underſtood at the ſame time, that all equitable allowances ſhall be made to the Eaſt India Company, for loſſes and calamities ſuffered by them in conſequence of the wars and misfortunes of the ſtate, or for benefits which the ſtate has received from the Eaſt India Company by the acquiſition of the territorial revenues, or in any other ſhape, for which the Company has not hitherto received any adequate return or indemnification.

In the preſent ſituation of the Company's affairs, and of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India, it can hardly be denied by any man, that an alteration of the Company's chartered rights to *a certain degree at leaſt*, may be juſtified, not only upon the ſpecial ground which has now been mentioned, but alſo upon another more general

ground,

ground,—that of urgent neceſſity founded on evident public utility;—upon that ground the extent of the Company's chartered rights and privileges has already been modified and limited by the interpoſition of parliament, particularly in the year 1773.—Upon both grounds therefore it ſeems impoſſible to deny the right which, in ſuch peculiar circumſtances, the legiſlature has to interfere with and to regulate theſe charters, and the only remaining queſtion muſt be to what extent that right of parliamentary interference ought now to be exerciſed.

In deciding this point, our enquiry muſt be directed to this material object—What deviation from the terms of the charters granted to the Eaſt India Company, or what mode of government of Indian affairs to be ſubſtituted in room of that preſcribed by theſe charters, will be beſt ſuited to the general intereſts of the ſtate?

When once that point is aſcertained, and if it ſhall appear, that the plan ſo calculated for the

the general intereſts of the ſtate, bears hard upon the ſeparate rights and intereſts, which the Eaſt India Company have enjoyed under the authority of charters and acts of parliament, that Company may then be well entitled to claim material aid and pecuniary aſſiſtance from the public, on account of their being deprived of the compleat benefit of their chartered rights before the expiration of the term for which they were granted, and alſo on account of the loſſes they have ſuſtained in conſequence of the wars in which the ſtate was engaged, as well as on account of the expence at which they aſſiſted in acquiring and maintaining the poſſeſſion of the territorial revenues in India.

In purſuing the enquiry that has now been propoſed concerning the beſt mode of government for Indian affairs, it is taken for granted, that our poſſeſſions in the Eaſt Indies, and our commerce with that part of the world, are objects of importance to this country, and that it is the decided intention, as well as the intereſt of

the country to make every proper effort for retaining that commerce and thoſe poſſeſſions.

Whether the commerce of India, and the eſtabliſhment of European ſettlements there, have been attended with real benefit, either to the Indian or European world, or to particular ſtates in Europe, is a queſtion very problematical; but in the preſent ſituation of things, it is a very different queſtion, whether it be now for the intereſts of Great Britain to retain, or to abandon the commerce and the eſtabliſhments ſhe has acquired in India.

If, on the ſuppoſition of her abandoning them, the conſequence were to be, that the commerce and poſſeſſions thus relinquiſhed by Great Britain, would not be acquired by any other European power, ſuch an experiment might be attended with leſs hazard; but as the certain conſequence of Great Britain's relinquiſhing, would be that of ſome other European power's acquiring thoſe valuable poſſeſſions, it ſeems to admit

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of little doubt, that the intereſts of the ſtate, as well as thoſe of many individuals, ſubjects of Great Britain, would be moſt eſſentially injured, both by what would thus be loſt to Great Britain, and by what would be acquired by other European ſtates, eſpecially as the acquiſition would moſt probably be made by ſtates, whoſe wealth and proſperity in commerce, are the leaſt compatible with the true intereſts of this country.

The proper object of enquiry at preſent is, therefore, confined to this point—Under what mode of government, and by what regulations will the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India, and the commerce with that part of the world, prove moſt beneficial to the ſubjects of Great Britain, both in Europe and in India; under which laſt deſcription, are comprehended many millions of the native inhabitants now ſubject to the Britiſh dominion in Hindoſtan.

As the government of our Indian poſſeſſions muſt neceſſarily be lodged ſomewhere, an option muſt be made of one or other of the following modes:

Either that the government of theſe diſtant poſſeſſions, as well as the commerce, be continued with the Eaſt India Company;

Or, 2dly, That the territorial poſſeſſions be declared to belong to the State; and, as ſuch, the executive government of them be confided to the Crown, in a manner ſimilar to the government of the other parts of the empire;

Or, 3dly, That an experiment be made, for a certain number of years, of Truſtees, appointed by Parliament, for taking charge of the Indian poſſeſſions, and of the affairs of the Eaſt India Company, ſubject to the control and ſuperintendance of Parliament;

Or, laſtly, That ſome mode of government be deviſed, by which the powers ſhall be diſtributed, partly to the Crown, partly to theſe Truſtees, and partly to Directors for the Eaſt India Company.

If the firſt of theſe modes is propoſed, the objections which naturally occur, are, that it would be prepoſterous and abſurd to give to a Company, inſtituted for commercial purpoſes, the government of a vaſt country, and of millions of ſubjects in India; that though the Eaſt India Company has been inſtrumental in theſe acquiſitions, yet they could be acquired only for the State; and that the conſtitution of the India Company, however well adapted to commerce, is inadequate to the government of ſuch an empire.

Farther, it will be aſſerted that theſe arguments have been confirmed by experience; for that the abuſes and diſorders which have ſprung up in India, prove the inſufficiency of the preſent mode of government, and the neceſſity of introducing

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a new mode better calculated for promoting the happineſs of the natives in India, and for makeing our poſſeſſions there more uſeful to this country.

Theſe reaſons ſeem to be of ſufficient weight ſo far as relates to the territorial revenues, and the government of the country out of which theſe revenues iſſue, but do not afford any ſufficient argument againſt the Company's being ſtill truſted with the management of their commercial concerns; eſpecially as it is maintained, that the Company, even before the acquiſition of the territorial revenues, conducted their affairs with advantage to themſelves, and utility to the State.

If the ſecond mode is propoſed, it will be objected, that by giving directly to the Crown the appointment of all the offices, civil and military, connected with this new empire in India, the influence of the Crown will be increaſed to ſuch an enormous

enormous pitch, as to make it dangerous to the liberties of the empire at home.

That it has been the object of late years to diminiſh that influence; but the extent and value of what is thus propoſed to be thrown into the royal ſcale, by theſe appointments in the Eaſt, would far exceed the weight of the influence which has been lately ſubtracted from the powers of the Crown in this country.

It will farther be objected, that as the power and influence of the Crown is preſumed to be exerciſed by the Miniſters for the time being, and as thoſe Miniſters are liable to frequent changes, either at the pleaſure of the Crown, or from their not poſſeſſing the confidence of Parliament, the object of reforming abuſes in India could not be ſo well anſwered by placing the government in the hands of Miniſters, liable to ſuch frequent changes; for that the ſervants in India have been long accuſtomed to diſobey the orders of the Eaſt India Directors, becauſe thoſe

Directors

Directors being frequently changed, they had a chance of protection from the ſucceſſors of the Directors whoſe orders they had diſobeyed; and upon the ſame principle, the ſervants in India might be diſpoſed to diſregard the orders of one ſet of Miniſters, in the expectation of protection from their ſucceſſors.

If the third mode of government, that by Parliamentary Truſtees for a certain number of years, is propoſed, it will be free from the objection which has juſt now been mentioned; but liable to other objections, which by many will be thought not leſs alarming.

In favour of this plan it may with great appearance of juſtice be argued, that in the beginning, at leaſt, of any effectual reform in India, there ſhould be a fixed board or government at home, for the management of Indian affairs, not liable to be changed during a certain number of years, in order that the ſervants in India might perceive that the ſame governing power which

iſſued the orders, would ſubſiſt for ſeeing thoſe orders put in execution ; and the circumſtance of theſe rulers being appointed by the authority of Parliament, and under the control and conſtant inſpection of Parliament would carry with it more weight than any other inſtitution or mode of appointment, ſince it would impreſs upon the minds of the ſervants in India a full conviction that their actions would be ſtrictly examined both by the board ſo appointed, and by Parliament itſelf.

In order the better to ſecure the obedience of the ſervants in India, it is alſo an ingredient part of this plan that the patronage now belonging to the Eaſt India Company ſhould be transferred to theſe parliamentary truſtees, who ſhall have power to place or diſplace all the ſervants civil or military belonging to the Eaſt India Company.

The objections, however, to this plan are, that it is unſupported by precedent, and may give

riſe to abuſes of a tendency dangerous to the conſtitution.

That by the conſtitution of this country the executive powers of government belong to the Crown, and are an eſſential part of the royal prerogative, that the uſeful and proper ſphere of Parliament is not to aſſume to itſelf the executive powers or the appointment to offices, but to act as a check and control upon the proper exerciſe of theſe executive powers lodged with he Crown, and that nothing can be more pernicious than the confounding together theſe two ſeparate provinces.

As a farther miſchief that may ariſe from this plan, it may be objected, that when Parliament appoints a certain number of ſupreme rulers for all Indian affairs, and eſtabliſhes their duration for a fixed number of years, theſe rulers muſt be conſidered as perſons who owe their appointments to the miniſters by whom their names were propoſed to Parliament, and the powers

conferred

conferred upon and exerciſed by them will, in effect, be ſo much additional influence given, not to the Crown, but perſonally to the miniſters, with whom the plan originated.

By thus conveying to theſe miniſters all the vaſt patronage of the Eaſt, they will ſecure to themſelves ſuch an influence and connection in Parliament, that they will become too powerful for the Crown to contend with—it will be an ariſtocracy, eſtabliſhed both at the expence of the royal prerogative and of the freedom of Parliament.

Amidſt theſe various objections to any given plan, there is a neceſſity for making an option, for nothing can be ſo pernicious as to ſuffer theſe apparent difficulties to deter from doing ſomething poſitive, for remedying the preſent diſorders in the affairs of the Eaſt India Company at home and abroad; moſt of the objections which are ſtarted either againſt the 2d or the 3d plan above mentioned, are objections founded

chiefly on ſpeculative reaſonings, which may be true, or may be falſe; but after all the noiſe that has been made about the abuſes in India, and the expectations which have been afforded of the interference of Parliament for remedying thoſe abuſes, as well as for ſupporting the credit of the Eaſt India Company, the certain conſequence of doing nothing, muſt be deſtruction to that Company, and a continuation of inſecurity, oppreſſion, and miſery to millions of the human race ſubject to the Britiſh empire in India.

The various objections, however, which, it has been ſhewn, attend every poſſible plan for India, ought to repreſs the violence of thoſe who exclaim ſo loudly againſt any particular plan for reformation of Indian abuſes, becauſe it has not been ſo fortunate as to be free from all real or plauſible objections.

Where the difficulty originates and is inſeparable from the nature of the ſubject itſelf to which the regulations are applied, it is not fair

to

to conſider the objections attending the plan as proofs either of incapacity, or of bad intentions of thoſe who have propoſed ſuch regulations.

It was impoſſible to frame any plan for India free from many apparent inconveniencies and objections; a plan of government for any country is a matter attended with no ſmall degree of difficulty, but that difficulty is infinitely increaſed where the country propoſed to be governed, happens to be placed on the oppoſite ſide of the globe, at the diſtance of many thouſand miles from the ſeat of empire; for a country ſo circumſtanced, a wiſe and well-digeſted plan of government, while it has for its objects the benefits to be enjoyed by the mother country, and the proſperity of millions of ſubjects in thoſe diſtant regions, muſt at the ſame time endeavour to counteract the circumſtances unfavourable to that proſperity, by controling and retaining within proper bounds the avarice and ambition of individuals—paſſions of the growth of every ſoil—but which, in Indian ſoil, the force, the magnitude, and the frequency of the

the temptations, as well as the diſtance from the ſeat of empire are peculiarly qualified to nouriſh; in theſe circumſtances, we may venture to affirm, that it exceeds the bounds of human genius to form any plan of government that will compleatly anſwer all the ends propoſed, or that will not be liable to many real objections both in theory and in practice; the beſt model will be that where the feweſt radical vices are to be found in its conſtruction,—any pretenſions to perfection beyond that extent, will ever be found chimerical and deluſive.

From theſe conſiderations, and from all the circumſtances which have been alluded to, it may with great truth be aſſerted, that the firſt propoſers of an India bill were placed in ſuch a ſituation of difficulty, that whatever plan they adopted, there was almoſt a certainty not only of its being aſſailed by a multitude of objections, but alſo of its being productive of much clamour and outcry, as either giving too much power to the Crown, or to Parliament, or to Miniſters

niſters, or to Eaſt India Directors and Proprietors.

Inſtead therefore of giving credit to the extent of that outcry, ſome degree of praiſe may be due to Miniſters, who at the evident hazard of loſing popularity, thought it their duty to bring forward, in a manly way, ſome bold, deciſive plan for remedying the diſorders complained of in Indian affairs.

If from the difficulty of the ſubject, or from any other cauſes, the plan introduced into the Houſe of Commons by Mr. Fox has been too bold, the diſcuſſions upon it will facilitate the taſk for thoſe who ſucceed in the buſineſs of propoſing regulations for Indian affairs; it will teach them to ſhape their courſe ſo as to avoid the rocks upon which the firſt bill has been loſt, and will probably tend to render any bill now to be propoſed, more acceptable to the public than it would have been if originally propoſed.

In judging therefore of the merits of Mr. Fox's bill, or of the comparative merits of any bill that may hereafter be brought forward, allowances ought to be made for the diſadvantages to which the firſt propoſer of any plan relating to Indian affairs was neceſſarily expoſed; and attention muſt alſo be paid to the evident advantages which the propoſers of any future plan relating to theſe affairs will enjoy, not only from the clamour which has been raiſed againſt the firſt bill, but likewiſe from the knowledge and experience afforded by the diſcuſſions upon that bill.

Examination of the Capital Parts of

Mr. FOX's BILL.

WHILE theſe diſcuſſions are recent, let us endeavour to form a juſt and impartial eſtimate of the great outlines and the conſtituent parts of Mr.

Mr. Fox's bill, with a view to diſcover what is valuable or faulty in it, but ſtill more with the material view of diſcovering what modifications or alterations of the ſame bill might, by removing the moſt ſolid objections, ſerve to render it acceptable to the public, without loſing the eſſential parts of its utility reſpecting India.

The plan contained in Mr. Fox's bill may be divided into five principal parts.

1ſt. That the ſupreme management of Indian affairs, with efficient active powers, as well as the powers of control and ſuperintendancy, ſhall be veſted in a board compoſed of ſeven perſons reſident in England.

2d. That a degree of permanency ſhall be given to the board ſo eſtabliſhed, by aſcertaining the ſituation and powers of the Commiſſioners during four years, ſo as that they may have it in their power to carry their plans of government and reform into execution.

In judging therefore of the merits of Mr. Fox's bill, or of the comparative merits of any bill that may hereafter be brought forward, allowances ought to be made for the diſadvantages to which the firſt propoſer of any plan relating to Indian affairs was neceſſarily expoſed; and attention muſt alſo be paid to the evident advantages which the propoſers of any future plan relating to theſe affairs will enjoy, not only from the clamour which has been raiſed againſt the firſt bill, but likewiſe from the knowledge and experience afforded by the diſcuſſions upon that bill.

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3d. That the perſons who are to execute this truſt ſhall be named by parliament, to whom they are to be accountable for their conduct, and to be removeable by an addreſs to His Majeſty from either houſe of parliament, but the vacancies by death, reſignation, or removal to be filled up by His Majeſty.

4th. That in order to ſecure the authority of that board, and the obedience of the ſervants in India, they ſhall have it in their power to place or diſplace all the governors, counſellors, and ſervants, civil or military, belonging to the Britiſh dominions in India, and in general ſhall have all the powers which are at preſent veſted in the Directors or Proprietors of the Eaſt India Company.

5th. That the board ſo to be appointed ſhall, beſides the government and management of the territorial revenues and poſſeſſions, have the government and management alſo of the commerce of the Eaſt India Company, during the above-mentioned period of four years, on account of the difficulty of ſeparating the territorial

torial poſſeſſions from the commerce, but that there ſhall be nine Aſſiſtant Directors for the ſole purpoſe of ordering and managing the *commerce* of the Company, under and ſubject to the orders and directions of the ſeven principal Commiſſioners, and the vacancies of aſſiſtant Directors by death, reſignation, or removal to be filled up by the Eaſt India Proprietors.

Theſe are the great diſtinguiſhing features of the India bill introduced by Mr. Fox.

With regard to the *two firſt branches* abovementioned, the objections that have been ſtated againſt them ſeem not to be well founded; on the contrary, the plan of eſtabliſhing a board at home for the ſupreme management and control of Indian affairs, acting under the immediate inſpection of the legiſlature, and reſponſible to parliament and to the public at large for their conduct; and the plan of giving to that board a certain degree of permanency, by ſecuring againſt their being diſplaced during a ſpecified

ſhort period of years, excepting upon an addreſs from either Houſe of Parliament, ſeems to be admirably well calculated for a ſteady government of Indian affairs, by enabling the board to follow out their plans with effect, and by ſecuring to them the obedience of the ſervants n India.

With regard to the *third branch*, which relates to the *authority* by which the perſons compoſing the board are to be appointed, there does not ſeem to be any neceſſity or any reaſon ſufficiently ſtrong, for depriving the Crown of the appointment of theſe perſons, and for tranſferring to Parliament that appointment.

It is not the proper function of Parliament to appoint to great offices in the ſtate, or to make choice of the perſons who are to compoſe a board for carrying on part of the executive government, though it may be the proper buſineſs of Parliament to control and ſuperintend theſe perſons when appointed by the proper authority.

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The appointment of the perſons belongs properly and naturally to that branch of the legiſlature which is intruſted with the executive government of the country, and there can be no good reaſon for deviating from that conſtitutional rule in this caſe, eſpecially as the powers with which theſe perſons are to be inveſted, and the time of their duration, are to be ſettled, not by the Sovereign alone, but by Parliament.

In another point of view, the propoſers of the bill, or the Miniſters of the Crown, ought to have no objection to the perſons being appointed by the Crown; for the Miniſters are entitled to have the confidence of the Crown both as to meaſures, and as to the choice of proper perſons for offices of buſineſs and importance; and it is to be preſumed, that thoſe who are miniſters at the time of an India bill paſſing into a law, muſt poſſeſs ſuch a degree of confidence both with the Crown and with Parliament, as to be able to get their liſt of perſons adopted either by the one or the other; and as theſe perſons,

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when once named, are not to be liable to be diſplaced for a certain number of years, it ſeems to be quite immaterial to the propoſers of the bill, whether the original appointment is to take effect through the medium of the Crown, or through that of Parliament.

In this view, the transferring to any other quarter, what ſo naturally belongs to the Crown, ſeems to be an encroachment on the prerogative without an object, and carries with it an air of diſtruſt that can ſerve no good purpoſe.

Concerning the great Extent of PATRONAGE *given to the Seven* COMMISSIONERS.

THE fourth capital branch of the Bill relates to the *Patronage*.

This, from its great extent, and from the importance and the variety of the objects it em-

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braces, becomes a matter well deſerving of ſerious attention.

On examining the different clauſes of the bill, it appears, that all the patronage which at preſent belongs to the Directors and Proprietors of the Eaſt India Company, whether in India or at home, is propoſed to be united and concentered in the ſeven Commiſſioners named in the bill; not only ſo, but their powers are, in ſome material caſes, to be extended farther than thoſe now enjoyed, either by the Directors or Proprietors, or by them both jointly.

By the third clauſe of the bill it is declared, that the ſeven parliamentary Commiſſioners there named, or any three of them "*ſhall have,* "*uſe, poſſeſs, and exerciſe all and ſingular* "*the powers and authorities which have* "*been at any time heretofore veſted in, or law-* "*fully exerciſed by, the Directors of the Eaſt* "*India Company or Proprietors, or by the Ge-* "*neral Court of Proprietors of the ſaid United* "*Com-*

" *Company, and all ſuch farther and other*
" *powers and authorities, and under ſuch di-*
" *rections, and ſubject to ſuch limitations and*
" *reſtrictions as in this act, or in any other act,*
" *the proviſions whereof are not hereby altered or*
" *repealed, are contained, for the government and*
" *management of the ſaid territorial poſſeſſions,*
" *revenues, and commerce of the ſaid United*
" *Company, or in any wiſe relative thereto.*"

This clauſe of itſelf gives to the ſeven Commiſſioners the whole power and patronage at home and abroad, hitherto enjoyed either by the Directors or Proprietors of the Eaſt India Company in all matters whatſoever.

But the 14th clauſe of the bill goes even farther than this: it enacts that the ſeven Commiſſioners, or major part of them, " *ſhall have full*
" *power and authority to remove, diſplace, ſuſ-*
" *pend, appoint, confirm, or reſtore, all and*
" *every perſon or perſons whatſoever from or to*
" *any office, ſtation or capacity whatſoever, civil*

" *or*

" *military in the ſervice of the ſaid United Com-*
" *pany, or within the limits of the ſaid United*
" *Company's charters, or any of them, or any*
" *way concerned in the management of their af-*
" *fairs within this kingdom, or in India, whe-*
" *ther any ſuch perſon or perſons ſhall have been*
" *nominated or appointed in and by any act or*
" *acts of parliament, or howſoever otherwiſe no-*
" *minated or appointed, except as is herein pro-*
" *vided and eſtabliſhed, as to the appointment and*
" *removal of ſuch Directors themſelves, and of*
" *the ſaid Aſſiſtant Directors.*"

This clauſe goes conſiderably beyond the powers at preſent enjoyed either by the Directors or Proprietors of the Eaſt India Company; for it gives the ſeven Commiſſioners the power of placing or diſplacing (amongſt others) the Governor and Members of the Supreme Council of Bengal, independently either of the Crown or of the Proprietors; this is a power which is not enjoyed by the preſent Directors of the Com-

pany, either as to placing or diſplacing; for the conſent or acquieſcence of the Crown is, by act of parliament, neceſſary to the appointment of theſe Members of the Supreme Council; neither can they be removed but by the joint concurrence of the Crown and the Directors.

To a certain extent, therefore, this clauſe has the effect, not only of adding to the ſeven Commiſſioners powers which were not enjoyed by the Eaſt India Directors, but alſo that of taking away from the Crown a power which it had already been in poſſeſſion of by an act of parliament.

The power alſo given by this clauſe of *reſtoring* ſervants of the Company to ſituations which they had formerly enjoyed, is greater than what was truſted to the Directors, for they could not reſtore any perſon, without the conſent of three-fourths of the Proprietors aſſembled in a General Court.

But farther, the terms of the 14th clauſe are ſo very comprehenſive, that while they transfer to the ſeven Commiſſioners, all the powers and patronage which the India Directors and Proprietors have hitherto enjoyed at home and abroad, they have likewiſe the effect of transferring to theſe Commiſſioners all the patronage, of every ſpecies, that has hitherto been enjoyed by any department, civil or military, in India, from the Supreme Council down to the loweſt eſtabliſhment in any of the preſidencies of Bengal, Madras, or Bombay; for nothing can be more extenſive, more unqualified, and unbounded than the expreſſive words made uſe of in the 14th clauſe above recited; and they would embrace an infinite extent of patronage in India which the Directors at home did not in fact enjoy, but conſidered as dependant upon and belonging to certain ranks and employments in that country, to which the exerciſe of that patronage was annexed.

When one reflects on the immenſe maſs of patronage and influence which would thus be

lected into one channel, it is really no wonder that it ſhould create a ſerious alarm.

In defence of powers ſo extenſive and unuſual, arguments have occaſionally been reſorted to, founded on the perſonal characters of the firſt Lord Commiſſioner, and of the other Members of the Board. It has been ſaid, that in ſuch hands, there was not only, no danger of an improper uſe of power, but that the ſtrengthening the hands of theſe Commiſſioners would ſerve only to increaſe their utility to the public; thoſe friends too, who have had the beſt opportunities of knowing them, have treated with a becoming indignation, the idea of ſuch men, with their own characters at ſtake, and with the eyes of the nation fixed upon their conduct, ſuffering themſelves to be the tools of any Miniſters, by perverting an eſtabliſhment for the government of India, to the intereſted purpoſes of political influence.—There is no man more ready than I am, to admit every thing that is due to the virtues and to the independency of the Earl of Fitzwilliam,

Fitzwilliam, as well as to the reſpectable characters of the other Commiſſioners; the choice of the perſons, with Lord Fitzwilliam placed at the head of that Board, may be allowed to give every ſecurity that perſonal integrity can afford againſt the abuſe of power; but ſtill it is the buſineſs of laws to proceed upon general principles, and to provide ſecurities for the intereſts of the public, independent of the conſiderations of perſonal character.

The accumulation of ſo much patronage in the perſons of the ſeven Commiſſioners ſeems to be liable to two objections; the one, that it is unneceſſary; the other, that it is dangerous.

It certainly cannot be neceſſary for enabling the Commiſſioners to execute their offices with advantage to the public, that they ſhould be poſſeſſed of all the Eaſt Indian patronage at home and abroad, and in all matters civil and military, political and commercial; many parts of theſe might with more propriety, and without

out diminiſhing the utility of the board, be confided and diſtributed into other hands.

But the principal objection and cauſe of alarm will be on account of the danger attending ſuch an innovation in the State, by conferring upon any ſet of men powers and patronage of ſuch an amazing extent. It will be felt as the introduction of a new power into the State, calculated on the one hand, to rival or eclipſe the powers and prerogative of the Supreme Magiſtrate; and on the other hand, calculated to give this new Board a dominion over the hopes and fears of a very large proportion of the ſubjects of the empire at home and abroad.

It is true, indeed, that, in one ſenſe, it may be ſaid, that the power thus propoſed to be given to the ſeven Commiſſioners is no new creation of powers, but merely a transfer from one quarter to another of powers which already exiſt; for the powers and patronage which the act propoſes to give to the Commiſſioners, are,

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at preſent, exerciſed either by the Indian Directors and Proprietors, or by their ſervants in India, and they are ſo exerciſed, without the Crown's having any participation in that patronage, (excepting in what relates to the appointment of the Supreme Council in Bengal;) from whence it may be argued, that there is neither any new creation of powers, nor any prejudice done to the prerogative of the Crown, by transferring to one claſs of ſubjects, powers which have hitherto been exerciſed by another claſs.

But arguments of this ſort are more ſpecious than ſolid. When a certain quantity of patronage, power, or influence is diſtributed and ſubdivided into various different channels, that diſperſion of the power averts the dangers, the jealouſy, and the miſchiefs that might ariſe from the whole of it being collected into one channel.

The very objection to that part of the plan of the preſent bill, is, that it propoſes to col-

lect into one compact body, the whole of that patronage and influence, which has hitherto lain ſo diſperſed and ſubdivided amongſt the members of a chartered Company at home, and certain claſſes of individuals in the ſervice of that Company abroad, that from that very circumſtance it was attended with no danger to the conſtitution of this country, eſpecially as the perſons among whom the power was thus diſtributed could neither act as one body, nor were they of that political deſcription as to make their influence felt upon the conſtitution, or in the Houſes of Parliament.

But thoſe ſources of power which were innocent, with reſpect to the State, when diverted into various ſtreams, may be productive of very different conſequences when collected into one great fountain, and that not far remote from the main ſprings of Government.—When thus collected, it acquires a force, ſufficient to bear down all before it, and to overturn the balance of the conſtitution.

Theſe reflections are directed againſt ſuch an alarming accumulation of power and patronage in the perſons of the ſeven Commiſſioners; and, perhaps, this diſcuſſion may aſſiſt us in a mode of ſolving the difficulty, by avoiding one of the ſtrongeſt objections that has been made to the bill lately under the conſideration of Parliament.

Let the total power and patronage of the Eaſt India Company at home and abroad ſuffer ſuch a *diſtribution* as may ſecure us againſt the political dangers which have been alluded to, and at the ſame time tend to conciliate the minds of men to the other ſalutary parts of this bill.

To ſay preciſely in what ſhape this diſtribution ſhould be made, would require an accurate knowledge of all the patronage belonging to the Eaſt India Company at home and abroad; but one general outline that may be ſuggeſted is this,

that in the diſperſion of that patronage, part of it ſhould be allotted to the Crown, part to the ſeven Commiſſioners, part to the nine Aſſiſtant Directors, and part to remain annexed, as formerly to certain ranks and departments in India, or at leaſt ſuch an order of gradation to be fixed as may make the portion of patronage left there leſs dangerous, or leſs a ſubject of jealouſy, in whatever hands it may be placed.

When the particular articles falling under the general deſcription of Indian patronage at home and abroad ſhall be exhibited to view, there will appear an ample fund for a proper diſtribution in the manner above ſuggeſted. In a ſubſequent part of this enquiry, it will be ſhewn, that the *commercial patronage* ſhould go either wholly or principally to the nine Aſſiſtant Directors. There will then remain to be diſtributed the patronage in all matters civil, military, and political. Though the whole of that extenſive patronage was by Mr. Fox's bill thrown into the hands of the ſeven Commiſſioners, it cannot with any

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colour of reaſon be maintained, that ſuch unbounded patronage became abſolutely neceſſary for enabling the Commiſſioners to render ſervice to the public in the execution of their duty. For inſtance, it does not appear abſolutely neceſſary, that theſe Commiſſioners ſhould have the appointment of all the military, from the Commanders in chief down to the loweſt officers in the ſervice, in the ſeveral preſidencies of Bengal, Madraſs, and Bombay. Neither, perhaps, is it neceſſary that all the members of the Supreme Council in Bengal, or that all the members of the Councils at the preſidencies of Madras and Bombay, ſhould be of the appointment of the ſeven Commiſſioners. It is no doubt proper and neceſſary, that a board inſtituted for the ſupreme management and control of Indian affairs, ſhould enjoy a conſiderable portion of power and patronage for giving efficacy to their meaſures, and to their plans of reform; but nothing farther ſhould be aimed at than what may be clearly and abſolutely neceſſary for theſe purpoſes.

In applying this rule, it will be found, that, exclusive of the *commercial patronage* proposed to be given to the Assistant Directors, there will remain a certain share of patronage to be transferred to other hands than those of the seven Commissioners; and if so, the genius and analogy of the British constitution suggests, that the Crown, to whom the executive government of the empire in general belongs, should be put in possession of that proportion of patronage.

A proper distribution of power in this manner, will be the most effectual method of allaying the fears and jealousies entertained by many, and of averting the hazards to the British constitution from the extent and magnitude of Indian patronage.

It may, perhaps, be objected, that the giving to the Crown any share, or rather any considerable share, of that patronage, would not be well relished either in the House of Commons,

mons, or in the country at large, as there has of late years been ſo much jealouſy entertained of any increaſe of the influence of the Crown, and that from that jealouſy the fate of the bill might be endangered in the Houſe of Commons.

That objection, if made, admits of ſeveral anſwers. It is by no means an agreed point that the influence of the Crown is at preſent too great; many men of ſound underſtanding, and true friends to the conſtitution and liberties of their country, are conſcientiouſly of opinion, that for the purpoſes of carrying on government in a proper manner, and with a ſufficient degree of ſtability, the influence of the Crown, and of courſe the influence of the Miniſters intruſted with the exerciſe of the powers of the Crown, has been too much impaired.

But it would be puſhing to an extravagant length this apprehenſion of too much influence in the Crown, if it were to be aſſumed as a maxim,

maxim, that whatever new acquiſitions may be made to the Britiſh empire, or however much her dominions may be extended, the prerogative of the Crown ſhall not extend to any part of the executive government of theſe new acquiſitions, or to any ſhare in the diſpoſal of offices belonging to them, leſt the influence of the Crown at home ſhould thereby be too much increaſed.

If a jealouſy of this ſort had been always entertained in England, the ſame reaſoning would, in an Engliſh Parliament, have gone the length of excluding the Crown from the diſpoſal of offices in Scotland when that country became incorporated with England, or from the diſpoſal of offices in Ireland, or in the Britiſh colonies in America and the Weſt Indies.

While the form of the Britiſh conſtitution remains, it is a neceſſary conſequence of the extenſion of the Britiſh empire, that the power or influence of the Crown, ſo far as relates to

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the additional number of offices which will thereby become at the diſpoſal of the Crown, muſt be proportionally augmented.

The oppoſite conſequence holds equally true, that the more the dominions or dependencies of the empire are impaired, in the ſame proportion will the power and influence of the Crown in the diſpoſal of offices be diminiſhed.

We have had ſo very recently an example of this latter ſort, by the diminution of offices in the power of the Crown, in conſequence of the loſs of America, that for this reaſon, amongſt others, there ought to be the leſs difficulty in allowing to the Crown ſome ſhare, at leaſt of what, by the prerogative, juſtly belongs to it, in the appointment to offices, and in the executive government of thoſe parts of the Britiſh dominions which are ſituated in India.

Concerning the Share of Power and Patronage to be given to the Aſſiſtant Directors.

THE 5th principal branch above mentioned of Mr. Fox's bill, is that which gives to the ſeven Commiſſioners the government and management of the Company's *commercial concerns*, but with the aid of *nine ſubordinate Aſſiſtant Directors.*

That there ſhould be Aſſiſtant Directors, and of a number ſufficient to attend to the various departments of the buſineſs, is highly neceſſary; for the detail of the commercial buſineſs of the Company is ſo very extenſive, that it would be quite impoſſible for the ſeven principal Commiſſioners to carry on that part of the buſineſs; their time will be ſufficiently employed by the political and other branches committed to their charge, which, if conducted in a manner ſatisfactory to themſelves and the public, will require more conſtant unremitting attention and labour than poſſibly they are at preſent aware of.

In committing to nine Aſſiſtant Directors the commercial concerns, theſe Aſſiſtant Directors will alſo find it neceſſary for them to dedicate a very large ſhare of their time and attention to the buſineſs ſo committed to their charge; for it is on their proper management of the commercial intereſts of the Company, that the proſperity of that Company, conſidered as a ſociety of merchants, and the value of the ſtock belonging to the Proprietors, will, in a great meaſure, depend.

For theſe, and other reaſons, it has occurred to ſeveral perſons, that the ſituation of the Aſſiſtant Directors is, by the bill, made too inferior and dependant, and that they have been too much ſtript of all manner of patronage.

They are made ſubject to the orders and directions of the ſeven principal Commiſſioners; and if they either wilfully diſobey thoſe orders, or if, in the opinion of the ſeven Principals, theſe Aſſiſtants have been guilty of neglect or miſde-

meanour in the execution of their office, then it is in the power of the ſeven Principals to remove and diſplace them.

This is not all; but from the ſcope of the bill it ſeems to be intended, that the Aſſiſtant Directors ſhould not have one particle of the patronage at preſent enjoyed by the 24 Directors of the Eaſt India Company, not even the patronage which is neceſſarily and ſolely connected with the commercial intereſts of the Company, ſuch as the employment of ſhips, warehouſekeepers, ſecretaries, clerks, and ſervants, for carrying on their own buſineſs, contracts for goods relating to the commerce, &c. By the extenſive words of the bill, all that patronage is transferred to the ſeven Commiſſioners.

There does not ſeem to be any good reaſon why the nine Aſſiſtant Directors ſhould be lowered, and deprived of all patronage in this manner; on the contrary, it would be more expedient, for various reaſons, that their ſituation

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ſhould be made as reſpectable as poſſible, conſiſtent with every proper ſecurity for their not counteracting the main objects of the inſtitution of the ſeven principal Commiſſioners.

There ſhould be the leſs objection to this being done at preſent, as it has been declared by Mr. Fox in the ſpeech at bringing in his bill, that after the term of the preſent bill, at the end of the four years, it is propoſed the Aſſiſtant Directors ſhould be choſen by the Proprietors, and that then the commercial concerns ſhould, if practicable, be ſeparated from the political, and from the management of the revenues and territorial poſſeſſions; conſequently when that happens, every patronage naturally connected with the commerce muſt go along with it.

Why, then, ſhould that patronage not be ſuffered to go along with it at preſent?

There are even additional reaſons why, in good judgment, the preſent bill ſhould allot and declare

a conſiderable ſhare of patronage to belong to the Aſſiſtant Directors; for it is the vaſt extent of patronage and power aſſumed to the ſeven principal Commiſſioners by the preſent bill, which has chiefly excited the jealouſy and the apprehenſions unfavourable to the bill.

The diminution or diſtribution of that patronage would have an oppoſite and a favourable tendency.

Such diſtribution would be uſeful both in appearance and in reality; in appearance, becauſe it would conciliate favour to the bill; and in reality, becauſe, for the reaſons already ſtated, the diſperſion of patronage ought to take place upon ſound political principles, in order to prevent the danger from too much power and influence being accumulated in any one quarter.

In no quarter can a ſhare of the patronage be given with more political ſafety, than to the

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Directors who are to manage the commercial concerns of the Company. This opinion does not reſt upon theory; for it has been found from experience, that even when the twenty-four Directors poſſeſſed the whole undiminiſhed patronage of the Company, no danger to the conſtitution, or to the freedom of Parliament, ever exiſted, or was apprehended from that quarter.

There will, therefore, be a general diſpoſition in the public, as well as in the Proprietors of the Eaſt India Company, (to whom ſome attention likewiſe is due,) to approve of the allotment of a conſiderable ſhare of the patronage to the Aſſiſtant Directors; and that diſpoſition will be the greater, becauſe it is felt to be a violent revolution in the ſituation of India Directors and Proprietors, that, from poſſeſſing the greateſt power of any body of men in the State, they ſhould, all at once, be ſtripped of every degree of power, patronage, and conſequence.

For theſe reaſons, I cannot help thinking that it would be well judged, in many reſpects, that the bill ſhould contain a clauſe, deſcribing, or rather *enumerating*, the articles of patronage which are to be given to the Aſſiſtant Directors; and the more ample theſe are made, conſiſtently with the great objects of the bill, ſo much the better.

Amongſt the articles of patronage which may naturally and properly be given to the Aſſiſtant Directors, there are theſe following:

The appointment of Secretaries, Clerks, and Aſſiſtants, at the India Houſe; Warehouſe-keepers, and others for carrying on the commercial buſineſs.

The purchaſing of goods, ſtores, &c. to be ſent to India, by contract or otherwiſe.

The allotment of the voyages, and every thing that relates to the ſhips to be employed

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in carrying on the commerce to and from India.

The appointment of *writers* to be ſent to India for the civil line, and of *cadets* for the military.

With regard to this laſt article, the Eaſt India Company were in the conſtant practice of ſending out *writers* long before the acquiſition of the territorial revenues, and alſo of ſending out *cadets*. The perſons who go out as *writers*, and riſe by gradation from that firſt ſtep to the ſituation of junior and ſenior merchants, factors, &c. are neceſſary for the commercial buſineſs; and the *cadets* are the raw materials from whence the Company's officers have been formed;—and here it is but juſtice to acknowledge, that under this mode of exerciſing the patronage, there have ſprung up in the Company's ſervice not only men eminent in the civil line, but many excellent officers, whoſe merits have been proved by actions that

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would have done credit to the military profeſſion in any ſervice in Europe. It has often happened too, that theſe officers of the Eaſt India Company have acted in the field along with the officers of His Majeſty's troops employed againſt the enemies of the State, or of the Eaſt India Company; and the teſtimony in their favour, given by the King's officers, with a willingneſs and liberality that does them honor, has ſerved to place, in a high point of view, the military merits of many of the Company's officers.

It ſeems moſt natural, that the power which has always been enjoyed by the Eaſt India Directors, of appointing theſe *writers* and *cadets*, ſhould be continued with the Aſſiſtant Directors. The taking it from them, and giving it to the ſeven principal Commiſſioners, could ſerve no other purpoſe than that of increaſing uſeleſſly their patronage, and by that means rendering it more obnoxious.

To the public in general it will be agreeable, that this ſort of patronage ſhould remain with thoſe Directors, who are to have the immediate charge of the Company's commercial concern, and who, at the expiration of four years, are to be choſen by the Proprietors as formerly; for it has the effect of diffuſing, through various claſſes of the community at large, the benefits of Eaſt Indian patronage. There are many reſpectable citizens, who, by the means of the Eaſt India Directors, have had opportunities of providing for their children, relations, or friends, in the civil and military lines of the Company's ſervice, to which they might not have had the ſame facility of acceſs, if the nomination of writers and cadets had been veſted either in Government, or in the hands of perſons in more exalted ſituations than thoſe of the India Directors.

It is a real advantage in a country, that there ſhould thus be a variety of channels, through which the benefits belonging to patronage

may be diffuſed and extended to various claſſes in the community; and, therefore, the placing this branch of patronage in the hands of the Aſſiſtant Directors, will certainly be more generally reliſhed, than if it were aſſumed by the principal Commiſſioners.

The veſting this, and other articles of patronage in the Aſſiſtant Directors, muſt be the leſs liable to objections too from this conſideration, that the bill has taken care that the principal Commiſſioners ſhall have a great check and control over the Aſſiſtant Directors; and even the power of removing and diſplacing them,—With ſuch a powerful control over the conduct of the Aſſiſtant Directors, there muſt be the leſs hazard in truſting them with a conſiderable degree of patronage.—The preſent Eaſt India Directors have a much more extenſive patronage, without any ſuch control.

This control introduced by Mr. Fox's bill, ſeems, however, very proper in the commence-

ment

ment of a new plan for the management of Indian affairs, for it will enable the principal Commiſſioners to carry their plans into execution, without the hazard of being counteracted in eſſential objects by the Aſſiſtant Directors, at the ſame time that it increaſes the ſafety and propriety of truſting with theſe Aſſiſtant Directors a very conſiderable ſhare of patronage.

Reſult of the preceding Enquiry.

THE preceding examination of the principal conſtituent parts of Mr. Fox's bill, leads to this concluſion, that there are certain eſſential and vital parts of the plan well deſerving to be adhered to and ſupported; particularly that which eſtabliſhes a *government at home* for the management of Indian affairs, under the immediate control and ſuperintendancy of Parliament;

and that which gives to the government ſo eſtabliſhed, *a certain degree of permanency*, by taking care that during a ſpecified ſhort period of years they ſhall not be diſplaced, excepting upon an addreſs from either Houſe of Parliament.

But it has been ſhewn that there are other material parts of the bill which require alterations, not of a trivial, but of an eſſential nature.—1ſt, In what relates to the *authority* by which the principal Commiſſioners ſhould be appointed.—2ndly, As to the ſhares of *patronage* to be annexed to their ſituations;—And, 3dly, As to the *ſituation of the Aſſiſtant Directors*, and the ſhare of power and patronage to be enjoyed by them.

What peculiarly requires moſt eſſential alterations, is, that part of the bill which relates to the PATRONAGE.—The tendency of the bill, from what appears upon the face of it, has been, to collect from every quarter, and to concenter in the board of Commiſſioners, the whole of the Indian patronage at home and abroad; the ſuggeſtions,

geſtions contained in this enquiry, proceed upon a principle directly oppoſite, that of *diſperſion*, inſtead of *accumulation*; for the extent of Indian patronage at home and abroad, when collected into one ſolid compact body, is ſo immenſe, and ſo much beyond all ordinary rules of proportion, that it is too much to be truſted in any one quarter.—If truſted entirely to the *Crown*, ſuch an additional quantity of patronage and influence thrown at once into the royal ſcale, would certainly make it preponderate too much, and with an evident hazard of overturning the juſt balance in the conſtitution.—But neither can it, with ſafety, be truſted to any Subject, or to any ſmall number or deſcription of Subjects excluſively; for ſuch enormous patronage and influence ſo veſted, would be a novelty of a dangerous nature, without precedent in this, or perhaps in any other ſtate in the world, and therefore might afford juſt cauſe of alarm to the intereſts of the Crown on the one hand, and to thoſe of the people, as well as to the freedom of Parliament, on the other.

For

For avoiding evils of ſuch dangerous tendency, it has been a principal object in this enquiry to diſcover a ſafer courſe than that to which either branch of the above alternative would evidently lead us; and ſince the whole of the Indian patronage, however great, muſt neceſſarily be lodged ſomewhere, it has occurred, that for the ſafety of the conſtitution, the intereſts of the ſtate, and likewiſe for the ſake of diffuſing the benefits of Indian patronage through various claſſes in the community, the beſt and moſt ſalutary plan will be that, which ſhall adopt a mode of *diſtributing*, inſtead of that of *compacting* the total patronage.—With this view, it has been propoſed, that the patronage ſhould be diſtributed into ſeveral different channels, in the following manner:

Firſt, that a certain portion of it ſhould be allotted to the *Crown*, to which, as poſſeſſing the executive government of the empire, the whole, or the greateſt part of that patronage, when the territorial poſſeſſions in India are declared

clared to belong to the ſtate, ſhould, from the genius of the conſtitution, of courſe belong, were it not that ſuch an addition of influence to that already enjoyed by the Crown, might prove fatal to the conſtitution, and therefore the danger apprehended from this circumſtance muſt ſerve to exclude every idea of giving the whole of that patronage to the Crown.

Secondly, That there ſhould be allotted to the ſeven principal Commiſſioners, ſuch a proportion of the Indian patronage as may be proper and neceſſary to give efficacy to their meaſures.

Thirdly, That a very conſiderable part of the power and patronage, eſpecially of that which exiſts at home, ſhould be annexed to the ſituation of the Aſſiſtant Directors, who are to manage the commercial affairs of the Company, and as to whom it is propoſed, that they ſhould hereafter be elected, as formerly, by the Proprietors of the Eaſt India Company.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, That a certain portion of the patronage in India ſhould be left dependant upon, and connected with, certain eſtabliſhments and ſituations in that country.

At the ſame time it is propoſed, that there ſhould be proper regulations, to be ſettled by Parliament, for regulating the conduct of theſe ſeveral deſcriptions of perſons, and for preventing, as far as poſſible, the abuſe of patronage and power in whatever hands it may be placed.

If the reflections which this enquiry has ſuggeſted are well founded, and if the communication of them could have any effect in producing ſuch a modification of Mr. Fox's bill, as might embrace the different objects alluded to in the courſe of this inveſtigation, there is reaſon to believe, that the jealouſies and outcry, which have either ſprung up naturally, or have been excited againſt that bill, would ſoon be reduced ſo low, as to make little permanent impreſſion; on the contrary, as the great *aſſumption of patronage*

was

was the circumſtance, which, ſeriouſly alarmed ſome perſons, and afforded to others the means of inſtilling prejudices againſt the whole of the bill, there is the greateſt probability, that, when that part which was in itſelf truly objectionable is removed, or reduced within proper bounds, the good ſenſe of the country in general, will diſcern and approve the merits of thoſe parts of the bill, which are calculated for producing that efficient, vigorous ſyſtem of government, which the exigency of the caſe ſeems to require.

Another advantage is, that the propoſed alterations could not fail to have a tendency to procure a more favourable reception to the bill in the Houſe of Lords, and to facilitate its paſſage through that Houſe.—Alterations ſo material would afford the beſt refutation of the reports, ſo generally ſpread, of an intention to force upon that branch of the Legiſlature, the ſame, or nearly the ſame bill which they have juſt now rejected.—The alterations propoſed are

certainly of ſufficient magnitude to blunt the oppoſition of thoſe who were adverſe to the plan firſt ſubmitted to Parliament, and to afford good grounds to many of the Peers who voted againſt the firſt bill, to adopt, upon conſiſtent principles, a different line of conduct, by ſupporting a bill eſſentially varied, and freed from thoſe exceptionable parts which, in the firſt plan, gave the greateſt and the beſt-founded cauſe of alarm.

THE END.

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